Increasing Voter Participation: Aligning Village and Federal Elections & Lengthening Village Terms of Office



Background

Larchmont/Mamaroneck Village share the following:

- Elections in the Villages of Mamaroneck and Larchmont are currently held on the first Tuesday following first Monday of November, each year.
- Each village trustee and mayor serves a term of two years.
- Village of Larchmont and Mamaroneck justices serve four year terms
- There are four village trustees, two village justices and one mayor

As of now Mamaroneck village officials are elected in two groups:

- Group 1: three trustees are elected every two years on <u>EVEN</u> numbered election years; Village justices are staggered every two years and are elected in <u>EVEN</u> numbered years as well
- Group 2: mayor, one trustee are elected every two years on <u>ODD</u> numbered election years
- Mayor Tom Murphy and Trustee Nora Lucas were up for reelection in November of 2021



ODD Year Elections - 1 trustee slot, 2 candidates



2019 GENERAL			MAMARONECK - VILLAGE TRUSTEE							
		DEM	CON	WOR	TFV	W/I				
	ΔWT	NORA A LUCAS	STEFANIE LIVIDINI	NORA A LUCAS	STEFANIE LIVIDINI	IRREGULAR	TOTAL CANVASS	BLANK -VOID	TOTAL BALLOT	
Town of Mamaroneck - 1	70001	69	40	4	18	0	131	12	143	
Town of Mamaroneck - 2	70002	110	50	4	27	0	191	22	213	
Town of Mamaroneck - 3	70003	252	60	4	33	0	349	20	369	
Town of Mamaroneck - 4	70004	182	40	12	31	0	265	14	279	
Town of Mamaroneck - 5	70005	73	34	6	25	0	138	8	146	

Town of Mamaroneck - 17

Town of Mamaroneck - 22

Town of Mamaroneck - 23 Town of Mamaroneck - 27

Town of Rye - 1

Town of Rye - 2

Town of Rve - 3

Town of Rye - 4

Town of Rye - 24

Town of Rye - 28

Town of Mamaroneck - 2 Town of Mamaroneck - 3 Town of Mamaroneck - 4 Town of Mamaroneck - 5

2020 GENERAL

Town of Mamaroneck - 1

Town of Mamaroneck - 17

Town of Rve - 1

Town of Rye - 2

Town of Rye - 3

Town of Rye - 4

Town of Rve - 24

Town of Rye - 28

DEM

DEM

DEM

MAMARONECK - VILLAGE TRUSTEE

EVEN Year Elections - 3 trustee slots, 6 candidates

Voter Registration: 2010-19

Year	# of Voters
2010	10,082
2011	10,274
2012	10,364
2013	10,668
2014	10,524
2015	10,474
2016	10,707
2017	11,632
2018	11,186
2019	11,558

On the left is the number of <u>ACTIVE</u> Registered Voters in Village of Mamaroneck, 2010-2019

2011 -> 3204/10,274= roughly 31.2% of registered voters


2013 -> 3977/10,668= roughly 37.3% of registered voters


2015 -> 3377/10,474= roughly 32.2% of registered voters

2017 -> 4650/11,632= roughly 40.0% of registered voters

2019 -> 3710/11,558= roughly 32.1% of registered voters

Voter Turnout (2010-20)





*Green is On Cycle, Purple is Off Cycle

2011

2012

2010

Source:

2014

2013

https://citizenparticipation.westchestergov.com/election-dates-and-calendars/enrollment-figures-and-election-results

Analysis: VoM Voter Turnout

ON CYCLE Elections have 36.9% more turnout than OFF CYCLE Elections

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Average Turnout for OFF CYCLE Elections
(3204 + 3977 + 3377 + 4650 + 3710) 5 = 3783.6

Average Turnout for ON CYCLE Elections
(2798 + 6562 + 4206 + 7184 + 4565 + 5777) 6 = 5182
5182/3783.6 = 1.369595095 = 136.9%

Average Turnout Percentage of Registration for OFF CYCLE Elections
(31.3% + 37.3% + 32.2% + 40.0% + 32.1%) 5 = 34.58%


Average Turnout Percentage of Registration for ON CYCLE Elections
(27.7% + 63.3% + 40.0% + 67.1% + 33.2%) 5 = 46.26%
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Demographic Composition of Off Year Elections


Off year elections affect the racial-ethnic composition of the electorate:

- In precincts with higher hispanic populations, turnout is lower in off-cycle elections, compared to non-hispanic districts.
- In precincts with less hispanic population, turnout is higher in off-cycle elections, when compared to more hispanic precincts.

% of 2020 voters that voted in 2019 compared to the % white population of the district



% of 2020 voters that voted in 2019 compared to the % hispanic population of the district



Source: https://www.westchestergov.com/boe99/

Proposal One:

*This chart assumes each official will win each election

Board of Truste	Tom Murphy	Nora Lucas	Daniel Natchez	Lou Young	Victor Tafur
Current Term E	November 2023	November 2023	November 2022	November 2022	November 2022
Alt. Term Start	November 2023	November 2023	November 2024	November 2024	November 2024
Alt. Term End	November 2026	November 2026	November 2028	November 2028	November 2028

"...If such resolution or local law shall become effective, the offices, the term or terms of which have been reduced, shall thereafter, except as is otherwise provided in subdivision seven of this section, be filled for terms of two years commencing at the beginning of the official year following the next general village election at which such offices are to be filled. No such resolution or local law, however, shall become effective within thirty days prior to a general village election." - Section 3-302, Subpoint 5b

Proposal Two:

*This chart assumes each official will win each election

Board of Truste	Tom Murphy	Nora Lucas	Daniel Natchez	Lou Young	Victor Tafur
Current Term E	November 2023	November 2023	November 2022	November 2022	November 2022
Alt. Term Start	November 2023	November 2023	November 2024	November 2024	November 2024
Alt. Term End	November 2026	November 2026	November 2028	November 2028	November 2028
Alt Term 2 End	November 2028	November 2030	November 2032	November 2032	November 2032

"...If such resolution or local law shall become effective, the offices, the term or terms of which have been reduced, shall thereafter, except as is otherwise provided in subdivision seven of this section, be filled for terms of two years commencing at the beginning of the official year following the next general village election at which such offices are to be filled. No such resolution or local law, however, shall become effective within thirty days prior to a general village election." - Section 3-302, Subpoint 5b

Relevant New York State Laws

The New York State Village Law explicitly stipulates election years can be changed to odd or even by the will of the Board of Trustees or by permissive referendum

Section 3-302 - Subpoint 7

"Biennial elections. a. The board of trustees of any village which has provided that the terms of office of all trustees, or the terms of office of mayor and all trustees shall be four years, may, subject to permissive referendum, adopt a separate resolution or local law providing that general village elections shall be held biennially in the odd numbered years or in the even numbered years, as they shall determine,"

In terms of the legality of changing term lengths of village officials there is substantive legal justification again in the New York State Village Code.

Section 3-302 - Subpoint 5

"Four year terms for mayor and trustees. a. The board of trustees, by resolution or local law subject to permissive referendum, may extend to four years the term of office of mayor, the terms of office for all trustees, or the terms of office of mayor and all trustees."

Three Examples

- Baltimore
- Austin
- Phoenix

Source: <u>https://elections.maryland.gov/index.html</u>

2004

197475

Example One: Baltimore

1999

96814

Baltimore Mayo


Total Votes

*Green is On Cycle, Purple is Off Cycle

2020

228600

- In 2016, Baltimore's municipal elections were aligned with the national general election.
- The 2003 election in September was postponed to November 2004 because of a clash between Maryland State Election Law and the Baltimore City Charter.



2007

41865

2011

46233

2016

233035

Turnout for elections in ON CYCLE years was 3.02 times higher than OFF CYCLE Elections

Average Turnout in OFF CYCLE elections: (96,814 + 41,865 + 46,233) = **184,912**

184,912/3 = **61,637**

Average Turnout in <u>ON CYCLE</u> elections: (197,475 + 233,035 + 228,600) = **559,110** 559,110/3 = **186.370** Source: https://traviscounty.totalvote.com/results/cit

2003

51318

Austin Mayoral

Total Votes

Example Two: Austin

2006


53151

*Green is On Cycle, Purple is Off Cycle

2018

227308

- In 2014, Austin's municipal elections were aligned with the national midterm elections.
- The 2006 and 2012 mayoral elections cannot be evaluated as <u>ON CYCLE</u> elections because they took place in May



2009

55595

2012

48882

2014

116308

Turnout for elections in ON CYCLE years was 3.3 times higher than OFF CYCLE Elections

Average Turnout in OFF CYCLE elections: (51,318 + 53,151 + 55,595 + 48,882) = **208,946**

208,946/4 = **52,237**

Average Turnout in <u>ON CYCLE</u> elections: (116,308 + 227,308) = **343,616**

343,616/2 **= 171,808**

Source: https://www.phoenix.gov/cityclerk/services/election-information/city-election-results

2007

Example Three: Phoenix


2003

Phoenix Mayora

*Green is On Cycle, Purple is Off Cycle

2020

- In 2020, Phoenix's municipal elections were aligned with the national midterm elections.
- The 2018 mayoral elections can be evaluated as an <u>ON CYCLE</u> elections because it was a special election held in November



2011

2015

2018

Turnout for elections in ON CYCLE years was 3.83 times higher than OFF CYCLE Elections

Average Turnout in OFF CYCLE elections: (99,224 + 97,973 + 100,557 + 131,100) = **428,854**

428,854/4 = **107,214**

Average Turnout in <u>ON CYCLE</u> elections: (246,447 + 574,411) = **820,858**

820,858/2 **= 410,429**

Supporting Research

- 70% of voters nationwide favor moving local elections to line up with larger ones.
- A study from California shows that turnout is 25-36% higher in municipal elections held concurrently with statewide races.
- In the last 5 years, California, Kansas, and Michigan have taken steps to line up elections
- An additional 5 states, Arkansas,
 Kentucky, Nebraska, Oregon and Rhode Island already hold municipal elections in November of even numbered years.
- Off-cycle elections typically have lower turnout for minority voters, while over-representing more affluent, white voters

Source: https://www.ncsl.org/Documents/Elections/The_Canvass_April_2016.pdf

Additional Benefit: Reduced Expenditures

- Off-cycle elections pose additional costs not just for the the administration, but for the voters themselves.
- Additional savings exist for the election administrators, as the cost of running one election vs two is cheaper, saves Board of Elections expenditure AND candidates' time and money
- Melissa Marschall, a Professor who leads the Local Elections in America Project at Rice University, has indicated that costs would be lower for municipalities who hold elections concurrently.

Sources: https://www.ncsl.org/Documents/Elections/The_Canvass_April_2016.pdf


https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326133664_Turnout_in_Local_Elections_ls_Timing_Really_Everything

https://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-moving-municipal-elections-concurrent.html


Analysis of Potential Concerns

- Will This Hurt the Minority Party?
- Does Voting In Federal Elections Decrease Down Ballot?
- Will This Increase Purely Partisan Voting?
- Will Candidates Run for 4 Year Terms?

Concern 1: Will This Hurt the Minority Party?



On the left is the margin of victory from 2000-2019 in Village of Mamaroneck trustee elections, by percentage, for Republicans. Negative values indicate a loss. 2018 and 2003 were input as zero values because they were uncontested elections. This claim is exaggerated because Republicans only suffer a -3% change compared to the off-cycle elections. Not to mention that Republicans have half as many registered voters in the Village of Mamaroneck as the Democrats do. Also, voter registration is fluid, and voters don't always vote on party lines.



Concern 2: Electoral "Fall off"?

Federal Turnout Vs. Local Votes Cast

A common concern is that our data is misleading regarding the amount of local and federal votes being concurrent. The following analysis shows that a large margin of votes cast in a presidential election are votes in local races in <u>ON CYCLE</u> election years.

Presidential Turnout in Village Mamaroneck:

2012 Election: **7474,** 2016 Election: **8267**

Average Presidential Turnout in VoM:

(7474+8267)/2 = 7871

Average Local Turnout in VoM in These Years:

2012 Election: **6562**, 2016 Election: **7184**

Average Local Turnout in VoM in These Years:


(6562+7184)/2 = 6873

Percentage of Federal Votes Netted:

6873/7871 = **87.3**%

Source: https://www.mamaroneckhistoricalsociety.org/presidential-elections

Concern 3: Will this Increase Purely Partisan Voting?



Using the calculation to the right, we applied this to the Presidential Election of 2016

2016:

2016 VoM Democratic Votes for President: 5142 2016 VoM Democratic Votes for Trustee: 3892

5142(.87) <u>= 4474</u>

3892/4474<mark>=.867</mark> 1-.757 = .133

That means <u>13.3%</u> of the Democrats voting in the 2016 presidential election switched tickets in the local election

This concern is qualitative in nature, but we did our best to prove some degree of split ticket voting in <u>ON CYCLE</u> elections.

Congressional Example

2012 VoM Democratic Votes for Congress' 16th: **3692** 2012 VoM Democratic Votes for Trustee: **3445**

2012 VoM Republican Votes for Congress' 16th: **2438** 2012 VoM Republican Votes for Trustee: **2685**

Republicans gained **247 votes** in the local election compared to the congressional election

Democrats lost **247 votes** in the local election compared to the congressional election

That means <u>6.7%</u> of the Democrats voting in the 2012 congressional election switched tickets in the local election, demonstrating some degree of engagement, We'll call this <u>Partisan Variation</u>

Concern 3: Will this Increase Purely Partisan Voting?

2012 Election Analysis

2020 cannot be used in this context because there were no Republican/opposition challengers

2012

2012 VoM Democratic Votes for President: **4725**

2012 VoM Democratic Votes for Trustee: 3445

That means <u>16%</u> of the Democrats voting in the 2012 presidential election switched tickets in the local election

This proves that there is <u>consistently</u> some degree of differentiation between local and national races when voters make their decision.

Voters are voting differently between national and local races

Concern 4: Will People Run for 4 Year Terms? List of all VoM Trustees who won, 2000-2020

Pete McConnell Elected 2000 Guy Zerega Elected 2000, 2004 Kathy Savolt Elected 2000, ran in 2002 William J Paone: Elected 2001, 2003, 2005 Joseph Angiletta Elected 2002, ran 2004, 2006 Christie Derrico Elected 2002, ran 2004 Antonio Vozza Elected 2002, 2004 Tom Murphy Elected 2004, 2006, 2008 Toni Pergola Rya Elected 2006 Randi Robinowit Elected 2007, ran 2009 Antoinette P. Rya Elected 2008, 2010 John M Hofstette Elected 2006, 2008, 2010 Elected 2010 Sid Albert Louis Santoro Elected 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 Andres Ez-Halst Elected 2012 Ilissa Miller Elected 2012, 2014 Elected 2012, 2014, 2016 Leon A. Potok Dave Finch Elected 2014 Victor Tafur Elected 2016, 2018, 2020 Keith Waitt Elected 2016, 2018 Nora Lucas Elected 2017, 2019, 2021

Elected 2018, 2020

Elected 2020

Dan Natchez

Kelly Wenstrup

A common concern is that new candidates will be deterred from running for village trustee or mayor due to 4 year terms.

Our analysis shows that a large proportion of village trustees in the past have sought 4 years as a trustee even with 2 year term lengths.

23 Village Trustees have won at least one 2 year term from 2000-2020

17 of those Village Trustees have run for a second 2 year term (Two were not given opportunity to run again, Andres Ez-Halst and Dave Finch, didn't decide on own to not run)

17/23 = 73.9%

73.9% of past VoM Village Trustees have run for another term after their first two year term.

This indicates that 4 year commitments are commonly sought after by Village Trustees

Benefits of 4 year terms

"You learn what the areas of expertise are for your other board members and you work to complement each other. When making decisions you can figure out what is going to be important to each board member and are able to make any necessary trade-offs earlier in the process without as many surprises...Things take a long time to get done in the government world. With a 4-year term you can advocate for projects and are there to steer them through to completion."

-Abby Katz (Town of Mamaroneck Trustee)

Conclusion

Implications

Our initiative has the following important implications

- 1. Increases Government Accountability
- 2. Makes County Election
 Administration More Efficient
- 3. Boosts the Effectiveness and Expertise of Village Officials
- 4. Makes Voting in Village Elections Easier

Our Timeline for Action



Building public support and outreach, finally pushing for